Online Book Symposium 2024:

Nick Shea's Concepts at the Interface (OUP)

13 December 2024, 4-7 pm CET

Joint event with Neural Mechanisms Online: www.neuralmechanisms.org




Participating in in-person events comes with challenges for many researchers, either due to funding, disability, or other social circumstances as well as the contribution to Co2 emissions.



We make it our mission to organise online events where state-of-the-art on the philosophy of the sciences of the mind will be presented and discussed open to everyone, regardless of their academic position and/or geographic location.



We strongly encourage scholars that are members of a minority group or are based in the global south to participate and engage. 




With Nick Shea


Discussants:

Sara Aronowitz

Chris Hill

Eric Margolis

Gualtiero Piccinini

Michael Strevens



Research on concepts has concentrated on the way people apply concepts online, when presented with a stimulus. Just as important, however, is the use of concepts offline, when planning what to do or thinking about what is the case. There is strong evidence that inferences driven by conceptual thought draw heavily on special-purpose resources: sensory, motoric, affective, and evaluative. At the same time, concepts afford general-purpose recombination and support domain-general reasoning processes—phenomena that have long been the focus of philosophers. There is a growing consensus that a theory of concepts must encompass both kinds of process. This book shows how concepts are able to act as an interface between general-purpose reasoning and special-purpose systems. Concept-driven thinking can take advantage of the complementary costs and benefits of each. The book lays out an empirically-based account of the different ways in which thinking with concepts takes us to new conclusions and underpins planning, decision-making, and action. It also spells out three useful implications of the account. First, it allows us to reconstruct the commonplace idea that thinking draws on the meaning of a concept. Second, it offers an insight into how human cognition avoids the frame problem and the complementary, less discussed, 'if-then problem' for nested processing dispositions. Third, it shows that metacognition can apply to concepts and concept-driven thinking in various ways. The framework developed in the book elucidates what it is that makes concept-driven thinking an especially powerful cognitive resource.